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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 18/05/2006 Accident number: 239 
Accident time: 09:15 Accident Date: 27/07/1998 
Where it occurred: Orya Khail village, 
Zurmat, Paktia 
Province 
Country: Afghanistan 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: [No date recorded] 
ID original source: none Name of source: MAPA/UNOCHA 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: PMN AP blast Ground condition: agricultural 
(abandoned) 
ditch/channel/trench 
soft 
Date record created: 17/02/2004 Date  last modified: 17/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
handtool may have increased injury (?) 
partner's failure to "control" (?) 
request for better PPE (?) 
request for machine to assist (?) 
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?) 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 
inadequate equipment (?) 
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 Accident report 
At the time of the accident the demining group was working in two-man teams operating a 
one-man drill. An investigation on behalf of the UN MAC was carried out and its report made 
available in September 1999. The following summarises its content. 
The victim had been a deminer for six years. His last leave was 53 days before the accident 
and his last revision course was four months before. The accident occurred in a ditch in 
agricultural land described as "medium soft" with gravel. The type of mine was identified 
from fragments found at the site. 
The investigators determined that the ditch had contained many mines thought to have been 
brought into it by heavy rains in the past. The victim found a detector reading. He put on his 
helmet and started to prod in a squatting position. He detonated the mine with his bayonet at 
09:15 (started work at 06:00). 
The victim's thumb was amputated and he received gravel lacerations to his body. 
The victim's helmet and bayonet were damaged but were not made available to the accident 
investigators. 
The victim was treated on site, then evacuated to "FMU", then on to hospital in Peshawar, 
Pakistan. 
The Team Leader pointed out that the team had only two fragmentation jackets that were 
being used by other deminers. He said the deminer was experienced and was working 
properly. 
The Section Leader said that the victim was prodding properly in a "half-prone" position 
when the accident occurred. He regretted the lack of fragmentation jackets and asked that 
more be issued.  
The victim's partner said that the victim was very careful but that the mines had been put in 
the ditch by rain and so could be at any angle. He thought that the use of a back-hoe in 
ditches could prevent recurrence. 
 
Conclusion 
The investigators decided that the victim was prodding too steeply for a deeply buried mine. 
He was not provided with a fragmentation jacket despite the fact that his situation in a ditch 
meant that he was allowed to squat and a jacket should have been issued [see “Analysis”]. 
 
Recommendations 
The investigators recommended that supervisors ensure that deminers approach deeply 
buried mines by making a greater excavation so that they can maintain a safe angle. They 
added that fragmentation jackets should be issued and that the demining group should be 
disciplined for allowing prodding in a squatting position without issuing protection. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 312 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: presumed 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: Helmet Protection used: Helmet 
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Thin, short visor 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES 
minor Arms 
minor Chest 
minor Face 
minor Leg 
severe Hand 
AMPUTATION/LOSS 
Finger  
COMMENT 
See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
A medic's report included a sketch showing lacerations and fragments to the victim's upper 
right arm, left chest, upper left arm, face, right hand and lower right leg. The medic recorded 
that his pulse was 80/min, BP 120/80 and respiration 18/min. 
His injuries were listed as: right hand fingers injured: right hand pollex amputated at third 
phalanx. Right arm injured and lacerated. Left arm injured. Left side chest haemorrhage. 
Nose and mouth also injured - incisors damaged but eyes normal. 
The medic's sketch is reproduced here. 
 
A photograph showed the left hand with the forefinger fore-shortened and all the fingers 
swollen and bloody. The abrasions on the upper arm and chest  appeared light. No other 
injuries were visible. 
 
 
 
3 
 Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because the 
victim’s visor was either worn raised or not worn and neither his partner nor his supervisor 
corrected the error. [The damage to the victim's face, nose and teeth indicates that his visor 
was worn raised.]  
It is possible that the visor was too damaged to see through properly (as was seen frequently 
during 1998, 1999), in which case the failure to provide useable equipment represents a 
serious management failing.  
The failure of the group's management to provide a fragmentation jacket may well have been 
because they did not have them. A few were issued by the UN MAC in the early 1990s but 
many of those are known to have been commandeered by fighters inside Afghanistan (a fact 
reported by senior UN staff, so known to them). The numbers available are not known and in 
any case the numbers issued did not allow for more than two per team. It is a little 
unreasonable for the investigators to expect deminers and their field supervisors to wear 
equipment they either do not have, or cannot all wear at the same time.   
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